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Meaningless Guarantees: Comment 
on Mitchell E. McCloy’s “Blind 
Justice: Virginia’s Jury Sentencing 
Scheme and Impermissible Burdens 
on a Defendant’s Right to a Jury 
Trial” 
Alexandra L. Klein   
If the criminal justice system believes that it can formulate 
coherent rules to achieve moral accuracy, the legislature and 
courts need to write those rules and allow them to be 
explained to juries in ways that make certain that juries are 
not being forced to “fill in the blanks” for the legal system.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the important role that jurors play in the American 
criminal justice system, jurors are often deprived of critical 
information that might help them make sense of the law their 
oaths require them to follow. Such information with regard to 
sentencing might include the unavailability of parole, geriatric 
release, sentencing guidelines, or other information that is 
relevant to determining a defendant’s penalty. Withholding 
 
  Visiting Assistant Professor, Washington & Lee University School of 
Law. My sincere thanks to Mitch McCloy, for the opportunity to discuss his 
excellent Note, and to Brandon Hasbrouck for his comments and suggestions 
on drafts. 
 1. SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE 
DEATH PENALTY 184 (2005). 
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information from juries, particularly in sentencing,2 risks 
unjust and inequitable sentences. Keeping jurors in the dark 
perpetuates injustices and undermines public confidence and 
trust in the justice system.  
Mitch McCloy’s excellent Note provides a compelling 
illustration of this problem in jury sentencing in Virginia.3 Until 
very recently, when criminal defendants in Virginia exercised 
their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, they had been 
sentenced by that jury in a bifurcated trial system.4 Although 
the trial judge provides the jury with information about the 
statutory minimum and maximum sentences, Virginia law 
provides that juries are not allowed to receive any information 
about Virginia’s sentencing guidelines.5 The jury may not offer 
recommendations about whether sentences should be 
suspended or run concurrently or consecutively.6  
These sentencing practices led, unsurprisingly, to 
inequitable results: defendants who exercised their Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial tended to receive far harsher 
sentences than defendants who waived that right and selected 
a bench trial. Mr. McCloy’s Note thoroughly evaluates the 
statutory and constitutional dimensions of this problem. Mr. 
McCloy’s Note is an exceptional piece of scholarship as well as a 
useful tool for academics, legislators, practitioners, and judges 
to understand the complexities of Virginia’s sentencing scheme. 
 
 2. See Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818, 1820 (2016) (per curiam) 
(holding that the defendant was entitled to inform the jury that he was 
ineligible for parole where the only type of release available under state law 
was executive clemency); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994) 
(“Because truthful information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant to 
‘deny or explain’ the showing of future  dangerousness, due process plainly 
requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury’s attention . . . .”); Fishback 
v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000).  
 3. See generally Mitchell E. McCloy, Note, Blind Justice: Virginia’s Jury 
Sentencing Scheme and Impermissible Burdens on a Defendant’s Right to a 
Jury Trial, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519 (2021).   
 4. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (2020).  
 5. See id. § 19-2-298.01(A) (“In cases tried by a jury, the jury shall not 
be presented any information regarding sentencing guidelines.”).  
 6. Id. § 19.2-303.   
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It is a compelling demonstration of inequity in Virginia’s 
criminal justice system that offers several practical solutions.  
Part I of this Comment discusses Mr. McCloy’s findings, 
analysis, and ultimate conclusions. Part II briefly explores two 
significant questions that arise from Mr. McCloy’s Note: the 
consequences of recognizing rights without meaningful 
enforcement and the problem of jurors’ preference for harsher 
sentences. This Comment concludes by offering some final 
thoughts on the necessary work to make our justice system live 
up to the promise of “Equal Justice Under Law.”  
I. THE ABSENCE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES  
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial 
in criminal prosecutions.7 Courts have lauded the important 
role juries serve in the criminal justice system.8 Jury 
participation serves key democratic functions.9 It ensures 
“continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.”10 The 
right to a jury trial prevents government oppression.11 Jury 
trials reflect checks on government power by “insistence upon 
community participation in the determination of guilt or 
innocence.”12  
 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”).  
 8. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) (“[T]he [Sixth 
Amendment] promise of a jury trial surely meant something—otherwise, there 
would have been no reason to write it down.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 149 (1968) (“[T]rial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice . . . .”).  
 9. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019) (“Other than 
voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens 
have to participate in the democratic process.”).  
 10. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the 
democratic elements of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and 
ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.”); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the 
jury as the “conscience of the community”).  
 11. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155–56; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 
(1986).  
 12. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; see Powers, 499 U.S. at 411–12.  
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Yet Mr. McCloy points out that in 2019, “jury trials made 
up just 1.3 percent of all cases in Virginia that resulted in a 
felony conviction. . . . [B]ench trials made up 9 percent of all 
cases and guilty pleas made up 90 percent.”13 Other jurisdictions 
reveal similarly dismal statistics about the use of jury trials and 
the predominance of the plea bargain.14 Setting aside issues 
associated with plea bargaining,15 criminal defendants in 
Virginia demonstrated a clear preference for bench trials.16 
Given the noble purpose and democratic function of the jury 
trial, why on earth did Virginia’s criminal defendants keep 
choosing bench trials?   
Mr. McCloy’s Note demonstrates a significant reason: 
defendants who opt for bench trials are more likely to receive a 
sentence within Virginia’s sentencing guidelines. He presents 
compelling data illustrating that jurors’ sentencing 
recommendations deviate upward from Virginia’s sentencing 
guidelines far more frequently than when judges sentence 
defendants.17 Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that, 
although judges have the authority to modify a jury’s sentence 
to one that comports with the guidelines, they rarely do—even 
when a jury’s sentence produces a manifestly unjust result.18 
Virginia’s decision to prohibit jurors from seeing the guidelines 
creates incentive structures that discourage defendants from 
 
 13. McCloy, supra note 3, at 531.  
 14. Id. at 532.  
 15. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (discussing the 
prevalence of plea bargaining); see also, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of 
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1033–34 (2006); H. 
Michael Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the 
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 75–77 (2011). See generally Brandon 
Hasbrouck, The Just Prosecutor, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021); Thea 
Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855 (2019); Candace McCoy, Plea 
Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 
CRIM. L.Q. 67 (2005); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 
YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).  
 16. McCloy, supra note 3, at 532.  
 17. See id. at 534–36.   
 18. See id. at 537–39.  
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exercising their constitutional rights, further exacerbating the 
problem of the decline in jury trials nationally and in Virginia.19  
Mr. McCloy has ably demonstrated that Virginia’s 
sentencing scheme likely imposed impermissible burdens on 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. This is a complicated 
issue, due in large part to shifting precedent from the Supreme 
Court. United States v. Jackson,20 recognized that congressional 
objectives “cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the 
exercise of basic rights.”21 The flaw in the Federal Kidnapping 
Act in Jackson was not its inherent coercion, but that it 
“needlessly encourage[d]” defendants to plead guilty or waive 
jury trials.22 Limiting the number of cases in which the death 
penalty was imposed was a legitimate purpose, but the chosen 
means—imposing it only when the defendant picked a jury 
trial—was a poor fit for those purposes because it placed an 
unnecessary burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.23  
The Supreme Court undermined Jackson a decade later in 
Corbitt v. New Jersey,24 when it approved a New Jersey 
statutory scheme that provided that defendants whom the jury 
convicted of first-degree murder received mandatory life 
imprisonment, whereas defendants who pleaded guilty could be 
sentenced to life imprisonment or a maximum 30-year 
sentence.25 Corbitt erroneously focused on the difference in 
penalties between that case and Jackson. In Jackson, the 
defendant faced the death penalty, but in Corbitt, the defendant 
was facing life in prison and the guilty plea did not guarantee a 
reduced sentence.26  
 
 19. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent 
of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the 
result of guilty pleas.”).  
 20. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).  
 21. Id. at 582.  
 22. Id. at 583.  
 23. See id. at 582–83. See generally Brady v. United States, 387 U.S. 742 
(1970).  
 24. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).  
 25. Id. at 215–16.  
 26. Id. at 217–18.  
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The problem, of course, is not the difference between life 
and death. The tension between Jackson and Corbitt is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s death penalty 
exceptionalism. The Supreme Court has required, as a matter 
of due process that juries be told in capital cases when a 
defendant is ineligible for parole if the defendant’s future 
dangerousness is an issue.27 In that situation, the jury must be 
informed so they do not unnecessarily sentence someone to 
death. While this is necessary as a matter of due process, 
decisions about keeping jurors in the dark may steer defendants 
towards waiving their Sixth Amendment rights because juries 
may be uninformed about the relevant law.  
I do not dispute that facing the death penalty may be a 
greater degree of coercion than other prison sentences. 
Nonetheless, the difference in possible penalties, to the extent 
that it undermines a defendant’s choice to exercise a 
constitutional right, is contrary to a defendant’s right to 
autonomy.28 
Mr. McCloy offers a nuanced approach to Jackson, 
suggesting it applies when there is an “impermissible purpose 
or motivation” for a statute, such as “needlessly encourag[ing] 
guilty pleas or waivers.”29 He reasons that, by restricting jury 
access to sentencing guidelines when the jury must sentence the 
defendant, Virginia’s sentencing system needlessly encourages 
trial waivers because it is not connected to the legitimate 
purpose of jury sentencing.30 The choice between a bench trial 
and a jury trial in Virginia is illusory if a defendant exercises 
their Sixth Amendment right to choose a jury trial and is 
 
 27. See, e.g., Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818, 1820 (2016) (per curiam); 
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994). Virginia has extended 
this to noncapital felonies and requires judges to tell juries that parole has 
been abolished. See Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 
2000). 
 28. Cf. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1505 (2018)  
With individual liberty—and, in capital cases, life—at stake, it is 
the defendant’s prerogative, not counsel’s, to decide on the objective 
of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the 
sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the 
State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 29. McCloy, supra note 3, at 542.  
 30. Id. at 543.  
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promptly rewarded for their contribution to a democratic 
punishment structure with a harsher sentence. 
Criminal punishment in the United States focuses on 
retribution rather than rehabilitation. Advocates for jury 
sentencing have asserted that juries are better suited to reflect 
community values and deliver an expressive message about the 
defendant’s transgression of community norms and values. Yet 
depriving the jury of critical information undermines 
retributive values by creating some punishments that are 
disproportionately higher than other punishments. It may also 
invite juries to consider impermissible factors, such as race, or 
lead to arbitrary punishments when a jury has to select an 
appropriate penalty within a wide statutory minimum and 
maximum.31 
The guidelines are, of course, discretionary. But they better 
serve critical retributive values of proportionality by ensuring 
consistency in sentencing. A jury’s function as a “community 
conscience” does not give it a monopoly on democratic 
legitimacy. The legislative decision to create the Virginia 
Criminal Sentencing Commission to standardize sentences also 
represents democratic consensus.32 As Mr. McCloy explains, the 
role of a community conscience also requires that community to 
be informed about the processes of justice.33  
Mr. McCloy’s analysis of the possible solutions is 
impressively thorough. Eliminating mandatory jury sentencing 
would solve part of the problem, and it would give defendants 
greater autonomy of choice. There is room to critique whether 
the criminal justice system actually could ever offer a defendant 
true autonomy, but through this solution, defendants would 
receive the benefit of a community judgment about their guilt or 
innocence as well as a proportional sentence. That said, if the 
jury does not receive sentencing guidelines, a defendant who 
 
 31. Cf. Alexis Hoag, Valuing Black Lives: A Case for Ending the Death 
Penalty, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 985, 989 (2020) (arguing that discretion 
in capital sentencing “allows . . . racism to operate undetected”).  
 32. I do not suggest that the Virginia General Assembly is somehow more 
“just” than a jury, only that the sentencing guidelines are not necessarily less 
democratically legitimate.  
 33. See McCloy, supra note 3, at 555–56.  
 
592 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2021) 
 
opted for jury sentencing may still receive a disproportionately 
harsher sentence. In this scenario, the defendant at least would 
retain a meaningful choice in the exercise of their critical Sixth 
Amendment rights.  
Virginia has taken this approach. Jury sentencing is no 
longer mandatory for defendants who elected a jury trial, except 
in capital cases.34 But this is arguably insufficient. Mr. McCloy 
concludes that the best approach should include providing 
jurors with completed sentencing worksheets for defendants as 
well as the ability to offer recommendations about sentence 
suspensions and whether sentences should be served 
concurrently.35 Under his approach, defendants would have 
more flexibility exercising their Sixth Amendment rights and 
jurors would have the information they need (and often want) if 
they are faced with the task of sentencing a defendant.  
This, of course, does not help defendants who had to waive 
their Sixth Amendment rights to a jury before the change to 
Virginia’s law. Those defendants still deserve a remedy for the 
possible violation of their fundamental constitutional rights. So 
although Virginians can, and should celebrate this critical 
reform, there is yet more work to be done.   
As the United States considers the pressing need for 
criminal justice reform, steps like those Mr. McCloy proposes 
are essential. These reforms are not sweeping, given the 
infrequency of jury trials in Virginia and in the United States. 
Yet these reforms are critical because they help to ensure that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is more than a 
meaningless guarantee.  
II. THE MEANINGLESS GUARANTEE 
Mr. McCloy’s Note raises two interesting considerations, 
which I believe to be interrelated, that this section explores 
further. First, courts undermine the meaningful nature of the 
rights they extoll when they fail to give those rights substance. 
Mr. McCloy’s Note highlights this problem by showing that 
 
 34. See SB 5007, 2020 Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020), https://perma.cc/Y5BH-
255G. 
 35. See McCloy, supra note 3, at 561–62.  
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failing to adequately inform a jury of sentencing standards leads 
to arbitrarily harsher sentences. Second, in considering the 
statistics Mr. McCloy had compiled, I began to wonder why, 
when given the statutory minimum and maximum sentence 
range, jurors tend to favor longer sentences.  
There is a difference between the idealized version of a 
constitutional right and the way the right is both realized and 
enforceable.36 Guarantees of constitutional and individual 
rights are not worth the paper they are printed on if 
legislatures, executive officials, and courts do not act to ensure 
adequate protection and enforcement for individual rights. 
Likewise, what about situations in which members of a 
community are charged to act in a way to facilitate someone 
else’s constitutional right? If that community is inadequately 
informed of its obligations, or fails to respect those rights, or its 
conscience is perhaps not entirely clear, then the guarantee of 
individual rights is essentially meaningless.  
Juror participation is essential to uphold another member 
of a community’s Sixth Amendment rights. But a jury trial is 
not a guarantee that trials will be fair or that the sentence the 
jury selects will serve justice. Looking back over United States 
history, juries have not been the idealized version of democracy 
courts describe. Through harmful community norms, 
exclusionary tactics, and judicial inaction, the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial has too often been form without 
substance.  
Consider the historic practices that ensured that Black 
people were not included in that community consensus either by 
ensuring that Black people never made it on a jury or 
diminished their participation by permitting nonunanimous 
 
 36. Cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 378 (1974) (“The equal protection clause states, I think, 
the finest aspiration of our society . . . . But, as anyone who has tried to 
challenge [discriminatory] practices in any forum knows, the fact of 
discrimination is one thing and its proof is quite another.”).  
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juries.37 In Strauder v. West Virginia,38 the Supreme Court 
explained that discriminating in jury selection based on race 
“amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws[.]”39 
Nearly a century later, the Court repeated this principle in 
Swain v. Alabama,40 only to conclude that the defendant had 
not suffered unconstitutional discrimination when the 
prosecutor struck all Black jurors because an attorney might 
use peremptory strikes on any juror.41 The Court also brushed 
aside concerns that juror rolls contained smaller numbers of 
Black citizens than White citizens, despite a process that was 
based primarily on state officials’ discretion to select men (often 
men they knew personally) who were “honest, 
intelligent . . . esteemed for their integrity, good character, and 
sound judgment.”42 
Batson v. Kentucky43 finally put a standard in place for 
assessing when a peremptory strike demonstrated purposeful 
discrimination.44 But Batson makes it awfully easy for a 
prosecutor to come up with a “neutral explanation,” for an 
alleged racially-motivated peremptory strike and has been 
heavily criticized for its failings.45 Although the Supreme Court 
has recently concluded that the Sixth Amendment incorporates 
 
 37. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (discussing the 
origin of nonunanimous juries). See generally Thomas Ward Frampton, The 
Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593 (2018).  
 38. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).  
 39. Id. at 311.  
 40. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
 41. Id. at 221–22.  
 42. Id. at 206–09 & n.4. Women were not even considered for jury service. 
Id. at 206.   
 43. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
 44. Id. at 96–97.  
 45. Id. at 97 (“[T]he prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level 
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.”); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 
231, 267–68 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the flaws in Batson); 
Paul Butler, Mississippi Goddamn: Flowers v. Mississippi’s Cheap Racial 
Justice, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 73, 82–83.  
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the right to a unanimous jury,46 “race-based exclusion from jury 
service” remains “central to criminal adjudication” in the United 
States.47 Yet courts have been unwilling, with the exception of a 
pair of Justices, to give constitutional guarantees meaning 
through more dramatic steps like eliminating peremptory 
strikes.48 At the time I delivered this Comment, the Court has 
yet to decide whether the right to a unanimous jury should 
apply retroactively, although it has granted certiorari to answer 
this critical question.49 It may well decide it should not apply 
retroactively, leaving defendants whose convictions violated the 
Sixth Amendment without a remedy.  
I raise these examples to highlight that the local concern 
Mr. McCloy’s Note addresses is a component of a problem that 
is endemic to our justice system. A right is meaningless unless 
there is a way to guarantee its protection and substance.  
That, I believe is where the second question connects to the 
first. Keeping the community’s conscience in the dark about 
sentencing norms interferes with defendants’ rights. Yet, even 
when offered substantial discretion in sentencing, juries aimed 
high. Mr. McCloy offers the example of Norell Sterling Ward, a 
Black man convicted of two counts of possessing heroin with 
intent to distribute and one count of conspiracy to distribute, 
who faced a five-year minimum and forty-year maximum for 
each count.50 The guidelines’ recommendation would have given 
 
 46. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (“[I]f the Sixth Amendment’s right to a 
jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, 
it requires no less in state court.”).  
 47. Frampton, supra note 37, at 1623; see Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. 
Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019); Butler, supra note 45, at 84.  
 48. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The inherent 
potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting 
the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban 
them entirely from the criminal justice system.”); Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 273 
(“I believe it necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the peremptory 
challenge system as a whole.”).  
 49. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 140 S. Ct. 2737, 2737–78 (2020) (Mem.) 
(granting certiorari to consider “[w]hether this Court’s decision in Ramos v. 
Louisiana, 590 U.S. ____ (2020), applies retroactively to case on federal 
collateral review”).  
 50. See McCloy, supra note 3, at 564 & n.265.  
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Ward a sentencing range from six years and four months to ten 
years and five months.51 The jury recommended sixty-five years 
or “a little under twenty-two years for each offense.”52 And 
because juries operate in secrecy, it is impossible to know why 
Mr. Ward’s jury settled on twenty-two years. We only know that 
they did.  
Jury sentencing provides an outlet for jurors to express the 
community’s displeasure with a defendant’s transgressions.53 
Without some method of channeling juror discretion, this 
exercise in retributivism fails to satisfy the proportionality 
necessary for retributive justice, rather than vengeance.54 It 
also raises questions of whether Virginia’s sentencing system 
invites unreasonably arbitrary penalties. It is possible that 
jurors’ perceptions and sentencing preferences are colored by 
their beliefs about the justice system, fairness, and what 
particular defendants deserve. And given what we know about 
race and the criminal justice system, we would be deluding 
ourselves if we dismissed concerns that a defendant’s race may 
be a factor in sentencing when a jury has a thirty-five-year 
range to choose from without substantive guidance.55  
Community standards of justice do not always comport with 
what is actually just. Consider the history of all-White juries 
 
 51. See id. at 564–65.  
 52. See id. at 565. 
 53. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“[C]apital punishment 
is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”); 
see also Chad Flanders, Time, Death, and Retribution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
431, 434 (2016).  
 54. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Alexandra L. Klein, Volunteering to Kill 34 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 55. See generally Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black 
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). Mr. McCloy’s 
Note leaves open room for another interesting area of research—whether 
juries deviate upward more frequently for Black defendants. While most states 
generally ignore statistical evidence of racial bias to demonstrate 
constitutional rights violations, such a study could show whether bias is a 
possible factor in jury sentencing in Virginia. The sample size of such a study 
in Virginia would be quite small, given the infrequency of jury trials. Such 
research would nonetheless be valuable.  
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sentencing Black men to death in trials held at record speed.56 
None of us would agree that was justice. But members (White 
ones, anyway) of that community at that time might have 
thought it was just. Lynchings, a “tool of racial control,” offer 
another example of a situation in which a particular 
community’s brand of “justice” was deeply unjust.57 As for the 
death penalty itself, there is substantial evidence that the 
penalty is disproportionately applied when the victim is 
White—reflecting community bias that certain lives matter 
more.58 In a slightly different example, grand juries similarly 
reflect community bias, “almost never” indicting police officers 
who have killed unarmed civilians—another demonstration of 
community preference leading to injustice.59 
A jury may be a tool against government oppression.60 But 
juries can also impose a community’s particular style of 
oppression, such as racial discrimination.61 When a jury is 
 
 56. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53–58 (1932); see also EQUAL 
JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL 
TERROR 62–63 (3d ed. 2017), https://perma.cc/5KVA-ZVEU (PDF) [hereinafter 
LYNCHING IN AMERICA]. 
 57. LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 56, at 27–29, 32; Hoag, supra note 
31, at 998–1001; Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 75, 82–84 (2009). 
 58. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–18 (1987) (“The raw 
numbers collected by [McCleskey] indicate that defendants charged with 
killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but 
defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in only 1% 
of the cases.”); id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s 
unwillingness to act upon McCleskey’s “striking evidence”); Hoag, supra note 
31, at 992–93.  
 59. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of 
Unjustified Police Killings—Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 397, 399–400 (2017).  
 60. Jury nullification is one example of a protection against government 
oppression. See Butler, supra note 55, at 701–05.  
 61. See Tetlow, supra note 57, at 76–77. Of course, jury nullification, 
referenced supra, can serve as a form of popular oppression ensuring that 
wrongdoers go free. For example, a jury swiftly acquitted Roy Bryant and J.W. 
Milam of the brutal torture and murder of Emmitt Till, (despite their belief in 
the men’s guilt) and complied with Sheriff-Elect Harry Dogan’s request to 
“wait awhile before returning a verdict in order to ‘make it look good.’” PAUL 
H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, SHADOW VIGILANTES: HOW DISTRUST IN 
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unwilling to do justice for illegitimate reasons, or that jury 
allows its own biases to enter the jury room, that jury deprives 
the defendant of their Sixth Amendment right to an “impartial” 
jury.62 Mr. McCloy has demonstrated that when a state’s 
sentencing scheme conceals critical information from jurors, it 
deprives the defendant of their Sixth Amendment right by 
pressuring the defendant to waive their rights.   
Virginia’s sentencing scheme left open too great an 
invitation for personal bias to creep in. Mr. McCloy’s Note 
highlights a key step for limiting jury discretion and ensuring 
more equitable sentences. Yet more is to be done. Informing a 
jury is an essential step, but it is equally important that the 
members of our society who will serve as jurors understand that 
the legitimacy of our criminal justice system rests on their 
willingness to do impartial justice.   
If we choose to keep jurors in the dark, knowing they are 
likely to produce arbitrary and inequitable results, then the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to an impartial jury is nothing more 
than a meaningless guarantee.  
 
 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM BREEDS A NEW KIND OF LAWLESSNESS 35 (2018). Despite 
the community’s preference for an acquittal, this sort of action, intended to 
preserve White supremacy, is not justice—nor could it ever be.  
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
